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Abstract
This research extends the agglomeration literature to a country that has not been studied and a market sector
that has received little attention. The majority of research that examines how density affects productivity has
indirectly measured productivity through worker wages or property prices. The research uses individual
supermarkets’ store productivity, proxied by 10 years of annual sales per square foot. Studying supermarkets
permits the examination of the effect consumers might have on productivity. Agglomerations (density) could

increase or decrease productivity depending on the relative extent of increased competition versus productivity
gains, as consumers choose where to shop based on their interests in reducing shopping time (transport costs)
and comparison shopping (product quality and pricing). Stores are described by who operates the store, the
brand of the store and the size of the store. Results indicate that density has a differential impact depending on
the store itself and the mix of stores nearby.
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1. Introduction
Much of the empirical work related to measuring agglomeration economies (the productive benefits of density)
measures productivity indirectly through observed wages or rents (Rosenthal and Strange, 2008; Combes et al.,
2008, 2011) or firm profitability (Jennen and Verwijmeren, 2010). In this paper, we examine the role of density
or agglomerations on the productivity of individual supermarkets in Chile. Our proxy for productivity is the real
peso value of sales per square metre for each store, measured annually for all supermarkets in Chile from 1997
through 2010. This is a significant departure from the prior literature, which has looked to input prices for
evidence of different levels of productivity. Instead, we focus on the value of output normalised by the size of
the store’s physical infrastructure. The question asked in this paper is whether clustering of retail stores has any
impact on productivity and, if so, what types of locations and mixes of competitors have the largest positive or
negative spillovers. These results can help inform how to devise better development strategies that incorporate
supermarkets. In fact, expenditures in the UK on food and non-alcoholic drinks are an increasingly important
part of a family’s budget and grew from 15.4 percent of total family expenditures to 16.5 percent over the
2005–10 time period (Office of National Statistics, 2011).
Agglomerations of supermarkets can be characterised as coming from at least two sources—production and
consumption. The first source, production, includes the traditional microfoundations such as spillovers from
worker interactions, historical decisions (where to place rail lines and ports, for example), the thickness of input
markets and other factors. However, many of the factors that would promote productivity gains may be less
important for a supermarket. For example, since most store sales positions require few skills there is likely to be
little benefit from having a thick and skilled labour force. Consistent with this, Gabe and Abel (2011) find no
evidence of benefits to low-skilled labourers from agglomeration.
The second source, consumption, includes non-traditional micro foundations focused on consumer demand for
low cost and high information consumption. Co-location of similar supermarkets may help to reduce search
costs and increase the number of potential customers (Picone et al., 2009). The search may be focused on price
or for particular goods or brands. Some households might find it advantageous to take a single shopping trip to
pick up cheap toilet paper from the discount store and a fresh croissant or organic vegetables from the upscale
grocer. This type of behaviour can extend the market area for all the stores in the location by creating a
destination. While these stories of complementarity make sense, stores selling similar products will also act as
substitutes and can just cannibalise a fixed demand in a certain location and lead to lower prices.
There is growing evidence that for shopping centres and large retailers, or big box retailers, agglomerations are
more important in determining sales and entry than proxies of location productivity and even access to the
transport network (Schuetz, 2013; Eppli and Shilling, 1996). Supermarket entry tends to decrease prices and
employment, but the effect attenuates very quickly (Basker and Noel, 2009; Ellickson and Greico, 2013). In Chile,
incumbent competitors tend to reduce prices before entry (Lira et al., 2007).

As Chile’s ability to distribute food has improved and consumer wealth has increased supermarkets have spread
across the country. The number of storefronts increased from 430 to 1040 from 1997 to 2010. This period of
rapid market growth and innovation provides a unique setting in which to study agglomeration effects. In
addition, as a vestige of the Pinochet dictatorship (1973–90), firms can enter and exit in Chile very easily due to
a weak regulatory environment and limited effective zoning (Zunino, 2006). This contrasts with the UK where
entry of supermarkets is heavily restricted leading to 25 percent efficiency losses in England and Wales
(Chesire et al., 2011).
This paper contributes to the literature on agglomerations by focusing on the role of consumer-driven density in
an important segment of consumption (food), using a unique dataset that covers the census of sales over a long
time period, and examining all these issues in the context of Chile, which has been rapidly advancing during a
long period of democratic and political stability in a weak regulatory environment.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the model; section 3 discusses sources of bias
and potential solutions; sections 4 and 5 present the data and empirical results; and section 6 presents our
conclusions.

2. The Model
We analyse the elasticity of supermarket store-level sales productivity in Chile with respect to relative density,
competitive conditions (concentration of some types of brands) and the variety of store types in the surrounding
area. Direct measurement of store productivity would include output per square metre for each store. We
observe the total value of the output (price times quantity) in each store over time and the size of the store. Our
proxy for output is the real peso value of sales normalised by store size measured in square metres. Since output
prices are likely to vary by store, it is important to control for input costs and profit margins which could affect
output prices.
We use an annual dataset from 1997 to 2010 of each store that includes sales, the description of store sales
area, brand and operator. Descriptions of the surrounding areas at each store include measures of the
population and households, estimates of relative density or agglomeration and the extent of competition.
Under the assumption that agglomeration economies and a firm’s specific production function can be expressed
separately, we defined the production function as follows

𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = g(𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 )f(𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 )

(1)

where 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the real sales per square metre of sales area for store 𝑖𝑖 in location 𝑗𝑗; f(𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 ) is the production function
of store 𝑗𝑗; and 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 is a vector with store’s capital, materials, labour and land all of them divided by square metres
of sales area; and g(𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 ) is a shifter due to location-specific characteristics.

A more specific description of agglomeration driven productivity shifts was proposed by Rosenthal and Strange
(2004)

𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 =

𝑔𝑔
𝑖𝑖
𝑡𝑡
, 𝑑𝑑𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
, 𝑑𝑑𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 )
� 𝑞𝑞(𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗 , 𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘 )𝑎𝑎(𝑑𝑑𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝑘𝑘∈𝐾𝐾

(2)

The quantity of activity in firm 𝑗𝑗 and firm 𝑘𝑘 is represented by 𝑞𝑞(𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗 , 𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘 ). The industry distance between
𝑖𝑖
firm 𝑗𝑗 activity and firm 𝑘𝑘 activity is represented by 𝑑𝑑𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
. The temporal distance between firm 𝑗𝑗 activity and

𝑡𝑡
firm 𝑘𝑘 activity is represented by 𝑑𝑑𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
. Agglomerations that took place in the past can have an impact on
agglomerations and perhaps even productivity today. In Los Angeles, housing density and prices are higher
today at locations where street car lines existed in the 1920s, even though they were removed by the 1940s and
𝑔𝑔
1950s (Brooks and Lutz, 2012). The geographical distance between firm 𝑗𝑗 and firm 𝑘𝑘 is represented by 𝑑𝑑𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 .

Taking logs directly from equation (1) leads to

In(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) = 𝛾𝛾In(g(𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 )) + 𝛿𝛿In(f(𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 )) + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

(3)

where 𝛾𝛾 represents a vector of elasticities of sales productivity with respect to local characteristics
and 𝛿𝛿 represents a vector of elasticities with respect to all inputs. We can rewrite this equation to control for
agglomeration

In(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡)) = 𝜶𝜶𝜴𝜴𝑗𝑗 (𝑡𝑡) + 𝜷𝜷𝜼𝜼𝑗𝑗 (𝑡𝑡) + 𝜽𝜽𝝁𝝁𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡) + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡)

(4)

where In(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) represents the sales productivity for store 𝑖𝑖 and location 𝑗𝑗; 𝜴𝜴𝑗𝑗 describes the agglomerations for
location 𝑗𝑗; 𝜼𝜼𝑗𝑗 represents other location characteristics where the store is located; 𝝁𝝁𝑖𝑖 is the specific production
function for store 𝑖𝑖; 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a specific shock for firm 𝑖𝑖 in location 𝑗𝑗; and 𝑡𝑡 indexes time measures in years.

We measure store productivity, 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , as the sales per square metre of sales area in real Chilean pesos. Our
measurement of agglomeration represents the fraction of supermarket activity in a location normalised by the
fraction of the population in a location. More specifically agglomerations are defined as

𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗 (𝑡𝑡)
�
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡)
𝜴𝜴𝑗𝑗 (𝑡𝑡) =
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗 (𝑡𝑡)
�
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡)

(5)

The numerator is the real pesos of sales in location 𝑗𝑗 as a fraction of sales in the whole country. The location’s
share of sales is normalised by the location’s share of the population. The primary definition of location 𝑗𝑗 will be
concentric rings around the store at 1000 metres and administratively defined municipalities.1 The elasticity of
productivity with respect to agglomeration is represented by 𝛼𝛼. Rosenthal and Strange (2003 and 2008) find that
localisation economies attenuate rapidly in the first few miles and that human capital spillovers are largest close
to college-educated workers. For retail sales, or supermarkets, the type of supermarket and the mix of types of
supermarkets are also likely to affect the extent of spatial spillovers and productivity gains.
Store productivity also depends on the firm-specific production function, µ𝑗𝑗 . The firm reflects a bundle of
attributes that are observable, such as brand, format and operator and some others that are not easy to observe
such as management in the store. The effect of these inputs can be controlled for with fixed effects, timevarying fixed effects, or information on these attributes.
Market characteristics of the store location, 𝜂𝜂𝑗𝑗 , could create shifts in productivity. Urban areas receive a 33 per
cent wage premium relative to the non-urban areas (Glaeser and Maré, 2001). The effect of location on store
productivity can be controlled for using fixed effects, time-varying fixed effects, or information that is specific to
the location. Location reflects the ‘natural’ attributes or other attributes that define the character and shopping

potential of the location. The error term 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a shock specific to store 𝑖𝑖 and in location 𝑗𝑗 in year 𝑡𝑡 that are
independent and identically distributed.

3. Potential Sources of Bias
Estimates of agglomeration economies must deal with at least three major challenges—measurement error,
endogenous explanatory variables and non-random selection. Fortunately, our measure of productivity and
agglomerations is derived from a census of storefront sales and is unlikely to be measured with much (if any)
error. Agglomerations are endogenous—for example, firms may be attracted to locations with higher
productivity, thus increasing agglomerations. Sorting can occur; that is, stores can non-randomly enter and exit a
location, depending on firm characteristics. For example, a firm may make different strategic entry and exit
choices depending on the type or format of the store involved.

3.1 Selection and Endogenous Agglomeration

The main purpose of this study is to identify the extent to which agglomerations, 𝛺𝛺𝑗𝑗 , impact store productivity.
Ordinary least squares estimates of 𝛼𝛼 provide an unbiased estimate only when the covariance, as defined here,
is zero

Cov(𝜴𝜴𝑗𝑗 , 𝝁𝝁𝑖𝑖 + 𝜼𝜼𝑗𝑗 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) = 0 = Cov(𝜴𝜴𝑗𝑗 , 𝝁𝝁𝑖𝑖 ) + Cov(𝜴𝜴𝑗𝑗 , 𝜼𝜼𝑗𝑗 ) + Cov(𝜴𝜴𝑗𝑗 , 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )

(6)

Agglomerations are correlated with the store type: Cov(𝜴𝜴𝑗𝑗 , 𝝁𝝁𝑖𝑖 )

Store location is not likely to be randomly selected. Real estate developers have information on competitors and
seek locations with higher productivity to enter. Therefore, higher store productivity may attract more
businesses thus increasing agglomerations.

Agglomerations are correlated with the location fixed effects: Cov(𝜴𝜴𝑝𝑝 , 𝝁𝝁𝑝𝑝 )

A ‘natural’ advantage or location attribute that increases the sale per square foot for the store and also
increases the agglomeration of sales will bias the estimate of α upwards. This could include factors such as
unobserved bus stops or changes in transport infrastructure.

Agglomerations are correlated with store sales shocks: Cov(𝜴𝜴𝑝𝑝 , 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )

For example, if the frequency of a store experiencing positive demand shocks depends in part on agglomerations
then the covariance will be positive. This may occur in dense and diversified shopping districts where the next
big fad or popular toy is more likely to be available. These shocks then increase foot traffic and sales for all
stores and hence the extent of agglomerations.

Common approaches used to reduce covariance issues
A common approach to these issues is to use various forms of fixed effects (Glaeser and Maré, 2001). These will
control for any unobserved location and store characteristics that do not vary over time and are related to the
selection of the location. In our case, we can control directly for the type of store by identifying the format, the
brand, the operator and store size. The location defines the potential customer base and the availability of a
labour force. Identification is aided by the entry and exit of stores and time variations in sales. Over the 1997
through 2010 time period, every municipality experienced at least some entry and in total over 700 stores
opened (entered). Since entry and exit is unlikely to be random, the estimation must identify what these stores
look like and the impact of store characteristics. Location fixed effects imply that 𝛼𝛼 is identified by changes over
time in the agglomeration and cross-sectional variation in agglomerations. Location fixed effects will confound
identification of α when location attributes affect sales and agglomerations at the same time. Examples include

the building of a new road or major construction on local access streets or highway off-ramps. One approach we
will use to limit this problem is to include individual store fixed effects.
Agglomerations and sales productivity may be jointly determined. Instrumental variables are one approach to
help identify the direct effect of agglomeration on sales productivity. Good instruments must be capable of
explaining agglomerations but not productivity. One potential type of instrument is population or location
information from a long time ago (long lags). These variables may be reasonable if they are related to the
persistence of spatial density but are not related to productivity contemporaneously. Following the spirit of
other studies (Ciccone and Hall, 1996; Combes et al., 2008, 2011; Mion and Nattichioni, 2009; Rosenthal and
Strange, 2008; and Redding and Venables, 2004), we use long lags of population. We use the population census
from 1885. Identification is aided because these measures come before the Pinochet dictatorship (1973–90)
which introduced a very open economy mixed with brutal suppression of the population’s political and
economic points of view, transforming Chile socially and economically. Strong economic growth did not take
hold until the transition to democracy began in the early 1990s. In short, our instruments cover a time period of
substantially different economic regimes and the country has undergone huge changes and growth since 1885.
In an effort to identify highly productive places in the past, we use the distance to the central municipality in
each region according to 1907 census. The reference point used in each of these municipalities was the central
‘plaza’ if the municipality was located in the central valley of Chile or the customs office if the municipality was
located on the coast of Chile. Most of the cities in the central valley were located in highly fertile land, which
would have driven population density and agricultural business activity in the 1800s. Now, the soil fertility has
no relationship with economic activity because the land is fully developed and is used in non-agricultural
activities. One example is Santiago’s central plaza, founded in 1541 and located on the fertile lands of the
central valley, 500 metres from the Mapocho River. Today, downtown Santiago is dominated by financial
services.

3.2 Two-step Market Area (Municipality) Approach

The empirical approaches discussed so far measure the impact of location characteristics on individual store
productivity. The use of concentric rings around each store creates a market area or location that is unique for
each store. This awkwardly mixes together in the fixed effects attributes of the location and the store. An
alternative approach is to use market areas or shopping destinations/districts as the definition of location. This
separates unobserved location and store attributes. This requires estimating time-varying market area specific
productivity measures and examining whether the location’s productivity is related to agglomerations and other
factors. For identification, this requires a two-step approach

Firststep: 𝑦𝑦ijt = 𝜽𝜽𝝁𝝁𝑖𝑖 + 𝜷𝜷𝜼𝜼jt + 𝜀𝜀ijt

Secondstep: 𝜷𝜷jt = 𝜶𝜶𝜴𝜴jt + 𝝍𝝍𝝀𝝀jt + 𝝉𝝉𝑻𝑻𝑡𝑡 + 𝛟𝛟𝑿𝑿𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀2jt

(7)

The individual store sales productivity equation (𝑦𝑦ijt ) is estimated in the first step. Explanatory variables are
store fixed effects (µ𝑖𝑖 ) and time-varying market area fixed effects (𝜼𝜼jt ). In the second step, the estimated timevarying market area productivity is explained by agglomerations (𝜴𝜴jt ), a vector of other location variables
including municipality fixed effects (𝝀𝝀jt ), other variables (𝑿𝑿𝑡𝑡 ) and time dummies (𝑻𝑻𝑡𝑡 ). This specification is similar
in spirit to Combes et al. (2008, 2011) and Mion and Nattichioni (2009). One key feature of this approach is that
permanent store characteristics are controlled for.

4. Data Description
In 2012, Chile had an estimated population of 17,402,630 (INE, 2012)—about the same order of magnitude as
the population of the US state of Florida in 2010. In 2011, Chilean GDP was US$234 billion—about the same
order of magnitude as the US state of Indiana’s gross product. Chile’s GDP grew on average at a rate of 4.01 per
cent over the 2004–11 time period.2 Chile is divided into regions, provinces and finally into 346 communes or
municipalities. The northern regions are dominated by mining industries, while the rest of the country has
manufacturing, transport, communication personal services and agriculture. In the metropolitan region, where
Santiago is located (the country’s capital), the main sectors of the economy are financial services, commerce,
restaurants and hotels. Together these account for approximately 50 percent of the Metropolitan Region’s
output.3
In 2002, supermarket sales in Chile represented 60 per cent of the retail food market, which is well below the
ratio found in developed countries. The penetration of supermarkets is 75 percent in Denmark, 70 percent in
Norway, 80 percent in Sweden, 88 percent in the UK and 90 percent in the US (Traill, 2006). According to the
National Institute of Statistics, between July 2010 and July 2011, supermarket sales in Chile grew 9.3 percent in
nominal terms and 8.4 percent in real terms. The number of supermarkets also increased for the same period
from 1067 to 1169. This trend has been a characteristic of this market for some time, with a yearly average
increase in the number of stores of 5.2 percent and in nominal sales growth of 7.4 percent for the period 2003–
10 (INE, 2011).
The sales information comes from a database provided by one of the competitors in the supermarket industry
and is produced by the National Institute of Statistics. The dataset begins in 1997 with 434 stores and ends in
2011 with 1171 stores. Each store is geocoded using the store address. For publicly traded companies, sales area
was collected from press releases. For the remaining 581 stores on-site observation was used (Smu,
2012; Cencosud, 2012; Walmart, 2012). To control for any error in the observation of sales area, we added a
dummy variable (Arq) to differentiate the first group from the latter. For each store and year, the brand, format
and operator are identified.
As part of the analysis, we need to control for the market concentration of competitors as well as the type of
store. By the end of 2010, store operators include
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Walmart Chile, with a sales market share of 36.5 per cent and 269 buildings.
Cencosud, with a sales market share of 27.8 percent and 158 buildings.
Supermercados Unimarc, with a sales market share of 22.4 percent and 274 buildings.
Tottus, with a sales market share of 5.9 percent and 30 buildings.
Others with a total sales market share of 7.2 percent and 199 buildings.

Store brand can differ from the operator and a single operator can run multiple brands. There are also a variety
of formats that each of the stores can use. Store formats or store fronts can be categorised as follows (Smu,
2012; Cencosud, 2012; Walmart, 2012)
•
•
•
•

—Convenience store: on average 1700 stock keeping units (sku) and 250 square metres of sales area.
—Traditional supermarket: 16,000 sku and 1550 square metres of sales area.
—Discount/wholesale store: limited assortment, 4500 sku and 2000 square metres of sales area.
—Hypermarket: 50,000 sku and 7400 square metres of sales area.

All of these stores have limited general merchandise (other than food) that represents no more than 5 per cent
of sales with the exception of hypermarkets that have close to 20 per cent of sales. In 2010, the formats include
supermarkets with 601 stores, discount stores with 244 stores, convenience with 64 stores and hypermarkets
with 113 stores. Traditional supermarkets look very much like supermarkets in the US (similar to Safeway).
Discount stores look like warehouses selling goods with open boxes and bins for consumers to sort through
(similar to Costco, but with more of an emphasis on processed food and less customer service). Convenience
stores are much smaller and cater to local consumption (similar to 7-Eleven). Hypermarkets are very large stores
that sell a variety of goods but still focus of food (fresh and processed). This supermarket segment is dominated
by Walmart affiliates (similar to big box retailers). In 2010, traditional supermarkets had the largest market share
of sales (55 percent) and hypermarkets were not too far behind (41 percent). Discount stores and convenience
stores had, respectively, much lower market shares of 3.6 percent and less than 1 percent. Over the 1997
through 2010 time period, all of the formats were growing rapidly but hypermarkets have been gaining
substantial market share from traditional supermarkets with a growth rate over 400 percent for hypermarkets
and a growth rate over 65 percent for traditional supermarkets.
We constructed the Herfindahl–Hirschman index (𝐻𝐻ℎ𝑖𝑖) to control for the market power of the operator. We
also construct a divergence index (𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑) to control for the variety of store formats (the industry distance
between firm 𝑗𝑗 activity and firm 𝑘𝑘 activity).
𝑛𝑛

hh𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 = � marketshare2jl
𝑗𝑗

𝑛𝑛

(8)

di𝑣𝑣𝑙𝑙 = � marketshare2kl
𝑘𝑘

Market share in the 𝐻𝐻ℎ𝑖𝑖 index represents the market share of operator 𝑗𝑗 in location 𝑙𝑙. Market share for
the 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 index represents the market share of store format 𝑘𝑘 in location 𝑙𝑙. For the 𝐻𝐻ℎ𝑖𝑖 index, a value of one
indicates monopoly, only one operator, and zero indicates an infinite number of firms with no significant market
share. Similarly, for the 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 index one indicates that all the stores in the area are of one format.

Tables 1 and 2 describe the variables. The variables are divided into store-level information and municipalitylevel information used in the two-step approach. Tables 3 and 4 provide the descriptive statistics for each of the
variables. There is substantial variation in the productivity of stores ranging from just over 13,000 pesos per
square metre to 1.8 million pesos per square metre. Consistent with the variety of store formats, the size of
stores ranges from 100 to over 13,000 square metres. Walmart (Op4) is the largest operator, with 15 percent
market share (based on store-years). Brand, when based on store years, is likewise very diverse, with the largest
brand (Santa Isabel, Br9) holding a 15 percent market share. The largest format is Traditional supermarkets with
a 77 percent market share. Within a format, brand operations can become very concentrated. For example, for
traditional supermarkets in 2010, operators Cencosud (Op3) and Supermercados Unimarc (Op2) have market
shares of approximately 29 percent each; and, for convenience stores, Resto (Op6, part of ‘other’) has a market
share above 75 percent.
Table 1. Description of variables for store level variables
Variable

Description variable

Unit

Basic information
Ω
Hhi
Div
Nominal Sales
Sales/Mt2
Mt2
Arq
Store operator
Op1
Op2
Op3
Op4
Op5
Op6
Store brand
Br1
Br2
Br3
Br4
Br5
Br6
Br7
Br8
Store format
Fconv
Fsuper
Fhyper
Fdisc
Instrumental variables
Census population
c1885
Distance
Dist

Supermarket agglomerations within a 1000 metre
concentric ring around the store
Operator market power within a 1000 metre concentric
ring around the store
Format variety or divergence within a 1000 metre
concentric ring around the store
Nominal sales of the store for each year
Productivity measured as real sales per square metre; CLP
of deflated by the national consumer price index
Sales area of the store
0 if company reported square metres and 1 if observed
square metres

Index
Index
Index
Chilean pesos (CLP)
Real CLP/square
metre
Square metre

1 if it is operated by Unimarc, 0 if not
1 if it is operated by the Supermercados Unimarc (SMU), 0
if not
1 if it is operated by the Cencosud, 0 if not
1 if it is operated by Walmart, 0 if not
1 if it is operated by Southern Cross, 0 if not
1 if it is operated by Others, 0 if not
1 if Brand is Express de Lider, 0 if not
1 if Brand is Hiper de Lider, 0 if not
1 if Brand is Unimarc, 0 if not
1 if Brand is Mayorista 10, 0 if not
1 if Brand is Montserrat, 0 if not
1 if Brand is Jumbo, 0 if not
1 if Brand is Santa Isbael, 0 if not
1 if any other brand, 0 if not
1 if format of store is Convenience, 0 if not
1 if format of store is Traditional Supermarket, 0 if not
1 if format of store is Hypermarket, 0 if not
1 if format of store is Discount, 0 if not
Population in 1885 census within a 1000 metre concentric
ring from the store

People

Distance to main ports and downtowns from the store in
1907

Kilometres

Table 2. Description of variables for municipality level data
Variable
Description variable
Municipality level data
Ω𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
Municipality retail activity density relative to Chile’s
density

Unit
Index

HHimuni
Divmuni
(Sales/Mt2)muni
Mt2muni
Instrumental variables
Census population
c1885muni
Distance
Dist1muni
Dist2muni

Municipality Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (Hhi) in terms of
real sales
Municipality divergence index in terms of real sales
Productivity measured as real sales per square metre; CLP
of deflated by the national consumer price index
Municipality average store size

Index

Municipality population in 1885 census

People

Average distance to main ports and downtowns of each
census block within a municipality in 1907.
Minimum distance to main ports and downtowns of
each census block within a municipality in 1907

Kilometres

Table 3. Descriptive statistics: store-level variables
Variable
Mean
S.D.
Minimum Maximum
Basic information
Ω
0.16
0.44
0.00
15.46
Hhi
0.67
0.26
0.18
1.00
Div
0.88
0.18
0.34
1.00
Sales/Mt2
329,899.70 201,325.10 13,108.76 1,875,984.00
Mt2
1806.29
2206.75
100.00
13,243.00
Arq
0.48
0.50
0.00
1.00
Operator information
Op1
0.04
0.21
0.00
1.00
Op2
0.08
0.27
0.00
1.00
Op3
0.12
0.32
0.00
1.00
Op4
0.15
0.35
0.00
1.00
Op5
0.03
0.16
0.00
1.00
Op6
0.58
0.49
0.00
1.00
Store brand
Br1
0.05
0.21
0.00
1.00
Br2
0.07
0.26
0.00
1.00
Br3
0.08
0.27
0.00
1.00
Br4
0.02
0.15
0.00
1.00
Br5
0.03
0.18
0.00
1.00
Br6
0.02
0.14
0.00
1.00
Br7
0.15
0.36
0.00
1.00
Br8
0.58
0.49
0.00
1.00
Format information
Fconv
0.05
0.21
0.00
1.00
Fsuper
0.77
0.42
0.00
1.00
Fhyper
0.11
0.31
0.00
1.00
Fdisc
0.07
0.26
0.00
1.00
Instrumental variables
c1885
16,355.93 32,160.91
1.00
177,271.00

Index
Real CLP/square
metre
Square metres

Kilometres

Dist
21.70
27.89
0.04
Note: The number of observations for store-level data is 8640.

184.91

Table 4. Descriptive statistics: municipality variables
Variable name
Mean
S.D.
Minimum Maximum
Municipality-level data
Ω𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
0.96
0.87
0.00
7.93
Hhimuni
0.66
0.27
0.15
1.00
Divmuni
0.86
0.20
0.34
1.00
(Sales/Mt2)muni
298,560.10 136,756.60 18,128.70 1,456,50.00
Mt2muni
1391.19
1182.23
150.00
8278.00
Instrumental variables
c1885muni
10,497.55 17,882.38
1.00 17,7271.00
Dist1muni
30.93
29.77
0.69
183.97
Dist2muni
28.31
29.67
0.00
182.05
Note: The number of observations for municipality-level data is 2121.
Measures of format (𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷) and operator (𝐻𝐻ℎ𝑖𝑖) concentration using a 1000 metre concentric ring show that
there is more concentration in format than in operators. The instrumental variables show that there was a
substantial variation in population in 1885 and distance to economic centres (ports and downtowns) in 1907.
The municipality variables echo these findings.

5. Results
Since there are repeated observations for each location, we relax the assumption of independence of
observations and use the Huber and White sandwich estimator of variance (Petersen, 2009). In addition, we
take the log of all continuous variables so that the coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities.

5.1 Basic Store Results

Table 5 presents ordinal least squares (OLS) results for the store-level approach. All the specifications include
store-level fixed effects. The first column, specification I, includes the basic controls and year fixed effects. The
results are largely statistically significant and the regression has good explanatory power (R2 is over 80 percent),
indicating that agglomerations (Ω) are on average positively associated with store-level productivity. Larger
stores (Mt2) are associated with lower productivity, perhaps indicating the inability of big stores to capture any
productivity spillovers. Store size also will be a strong proxy for the format of the store. More market power of
the operator (Hhi) or the format (div) is associated with more productive stores. Specification II includes a
format dummy variable with traditional supermarkets as the reference group. The format dummies are largely
insignificant indicating that store size (Mt2) and store-level dummies are likely to provide very good proxies for
format. Specification III includes brand and operator dummy variables with other being the excluded category
for both. There is little evidence that the operator makes much difference in store productivity. Brand does
seem to matter with Express de Lider and Santa Isabel being the most productive brands. However, the
explanatory power of the results is not greatly improved and these additional controls have no meaningful
impact on the role of agglomerations.
Table 5. Store ordinary least squares results (dependent variable: ln(Sales/Mt2))
Category

Variable

I
Coefficient S.E.

II
Coefficient S.E.

III
Coefficient S.E.

Basic

ln(Ω)

0.32***

0.32***

0.31***

0.03

0.03

0.03

ln(Hhi)
ln(Div)
arq
ln(Mt2)
Operator

Brand

format

0.16*
0.08*
-0.13*
-0.81***

0.10
0.05
0.08
0.19

0.17*
0.08
-0.13*
-0.84***

0.09
0.05
0.07
0.16

0.17*
0.08*
-0.08
-0.87*

0.09
0.05
0.07
0.13

Op1

0.20

0.06

Op2
Op3
Op4
Op5
Br1
Br2
Br3
Br4
Br5
Br6
Br7
Fconv
Fhyper
Fdisc
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
Constant
Store fixed effects

0.05
0.06
-0.22
-0.04
0.42***
0.08
-0.11**
-0.09
-4.05***
0.78*
-0.02

0.04
0.04
0.13
0.05
0.14
0.14
0.05
0.07
0.15
0.33
0.06

0.10
0.09
0.36*
0.20
-0.39
0.27
Year
0.02*
0.01
0.02*
0.01
0.02*
0.01
-0.03*
0.02
-0.04*
0.02
-0.04*
0.02
-0.05**
0.02
-0.05***
0.02
-0.05***
0.02
-0.06**
0.02
-0.06***
0.02
-0.06***
0.02
-0.07***
0.03
-0.07***
0.03
-0.07***
0.03
-0.06*
0.03
-0.06*
0.03
-0.06*
0.03
-0.04
0.03
-0.04
0.03
-0.05
0.04
-0.03
0.04
-0.03
0.04
-0.04
0.04
-0.02
0.04
-0.02
0.04
-0.03
0.04
-0.01
0.04
0.00
0.04
-0.01
0.04
0.03
0.04
0.03
0.04
0.02
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.08*
0.05
0.08*
0.05
0.07
0.05
19.19***
1.19
19.36***
0.99
19.35
0.86
y
y
y
Observations
8640
8640
8640
Stores
863
863
863
R2
0.8341
0.8356
0.8377
Notes: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Excluded categories are: operated by others, brand other, format
traditional supermarket, and year 1997. Concentric rings are 1000 square metres. T-statistics are clustered by
store and robust.
Table 6 indicates that the OLS results were biased as the estimated coefficient for the instrumented
agglomeration drops from 0.31 to 0.05 and becomes statistically insignificant. Again, store-level fixed effects are
included, but agglomerations are instrumented using population within 1000 metres of the store in 1885 and
the distance to main ports and downtowns in 1907. The bottom panel provides statistics on how the
instruments performed as a tool for identification. The instruments provided some additional explanatory power
of agglomerations beyond the other control variables with an R2 of 0.12 and a statistically significant F-statistic

of 3.90. The null hypothesis of weak and underidentification is rejected using Kleibergen–Paap tests. The Hansen
J-statistic does not reject the null that the instruments are valid. In sum, the instruments seem to be reasonable
and provide modest explanatory power. However, this should be expected given the 100-year time interval and
the time-invariant nature of the instruments.
Table 6. Store instrumental variables (IV) results (dependent variable: ln(Sales/Mt2))
Category
Shopping

Operator

Brand

Variable
ln(Ω)

Coefficient SE
0.05
0.07

ln(Hhi)
ln(Div)
arq
ln(Mt2)
Op1
Op2
Op3
Op4
Op5
Br1
Br2
Br3
Br4
Br5
Br6
Br7
Constant
Year dummies
Store fixed effects

0.19**
-0.14*
-0.22***
-0.02
0.31***
0.10***
0.08*
-0.40**
-0.14
0.61***
0.78***
-0.07
-0.03
0.26
0.68***
0.12
14.04***
y
y
8640
863
0.7095

0.09
0.07
0.07
0.10
0.06
0.04
0.04
0.16
0.14
0.19
0.24
0.06
0.07
0.19
0.18
0.09
0.47

Observations
Stores
R2
First-stage statistics
1st-stage F-statistic on excluded instruments
3.90***
Partial R2 of excluded instruments
0.12
Weak identification test
Kleibergen–Paap Wald rk F statistic (Chi-squared)
33.44**
Underidenitfication test
Kleibergen–Paap rk LM statistic (Chi-squared)
80.04***
Overidentification test of all instruments
Hansen J-statistic
1.41
Notes: * p <0.1; ** p <0.05; *** p <0.01. Excluded categories are: operated by others, brand other, format
wholesaler, and year 1997. T-statistics and identification tests are clustered by municipality and robust. Excluded
instruments are the log of population in 1885 within a 1000 metre concentric ring around the store and a 5000
metre concentric ring, and the log of the distance to the nearest main ports and downtown in 1907.

The results also indicate that the operator is a more important determinate of store productivity than indicated
in the OLS results. In particular, Unimarc operated stores are the most productive and Walmart operated stores
are the least. In addition, store size is no longer significant and the sign switches on format market power. The
coefficient for operator market power is still positive.

5.2 Basic Municipality Results

These results follow the specification of the two-step approach discussed in section 3. In the first step, the
specification explains store productivity using dummy variables for each store and time variant dummy variables
for each municipality. The time-variant municipality coefficients provide an estimate of municipality productivity
over time which controls for the effect of the stores located in the municipality. This municipality measure of
productivity is then explained in a second step by municipality agglomerations (𝛺𝛺𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ), municipality market
power of the operator and format (𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 and 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ), year dummies, average store size in the municipality
(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀2𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ), the average age of stores in the municipality (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ), year dummies and municipality fixed
effects. To help account for the precision of the left-hand variable, each observation is weighted by the inverse
of the first-stage coefficient’s standard errors.
The first column of Table 7 reports the OLS results and the second column reports the instrumental variables (IV)
results (𝛺𝛺𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ). Both approaches provide good explanatory power with R2s over 0.84. Format market power or
concentration is associated with lower productivity. Operator market power has no effect and neither does the
age of the building. Similar to the store results, the IV results show no relationship between agglomerations and
productivity, while the OLS results find a positive and significant elasticity. The excluded instruments partial R2 of
0.27 and a statistically significant F-statistic indicate that the instrumental variables seem to function
adequately. Again, the null hypothesis of weak and underidentification is rejected and the Hansen J-statistic
does not reject the null that the instruments are valid.
Table 7. Municipality results (dependent variable: predicted ln(Sales/Mt2)muni)
Variable

IV

OLS
Coefficient S.E.

S.E.

Coefficient

ln(Ωmuni)

0.22***

0.05 0.00

0.11

ln(Hhimuni)
ln(Divmuni)
ln(Mt2muni)
ln(agemuni)
Constant
Year dummies
Municipality fixed effects
Observations
Municipalities
R2

0.01
0.20**
-0.07
0.00
-0.44
y
y
2112
177
0.8683

0.09
0.10
0.12
0.00
0.68

0.10
0.09
0.12
0.00
0.78

-0.08
0.22**
0.01
0.00
-1.13
y
y
2112
177
0.8484

First-stage statistics

1st-stage F-statistic on excluded instruments
Partial R2 of excluded instruments
Weak identification test
Kleibergen–Paap Wald rk F statistic (Chi-squared)
Underidenitfication test
Kleibergen–Paap rk LM statistic (Chi-squared)

7.71***
0.27
20.14**
45.24***

Overidentification test of all instruments
Hansen J-statistic
5.74
Notes: * p <0.1; ** p <0.05; *** p <0.01. Excluded categories are: year 1997 and a municipality. T-statistics are
clustered by municipality and robust. Excluded instruments are log of population in the municipality in 1885, the
log of the average distance to main ports and downtowns of each census block within a municipality and the
minimum distance to main ports and downtowns of each census block within a municipality in 1907.

5.3 Differential Impacts of Agglomerations

Table 8 asks the question of whether agglomerations have differential impacts on productivity by store format.
Using the IV approach, the first and second groups of columns report results using the store-level and
municipality approaches. The sample is limited in each row to only stores of one format and then the
specification is rerun on that sub-sample.4 Half of the coefficients are statistically significant and never across
both estimation approaches. However, there is some consistency in the sign of the coefficients. Agglomerations
tend to reduce productivity for discount/warehouse stores and traditional supermarkets. Both of these store
formats are large, stand-alone or anchor types of stores which are viewed by property managers and developers
as stores that bring in customer traffic but do not necessarily benefit from customer traffic generated by other
businesses. By contrast, convenience stores rely on being in the right location when customers are already
shopping. Therefore, as expected, the coefficient on agglomerations is positive and significant for the
municipality specification for convenience stores. This may reflect the importance of ‘shopping districts’ or
destinations when measuring agglomerations for secondary retail (non-anchor).
Table 8. IV results for overall agglomerations by store format (dependent variable: ln(Sales/Mt2))
Store format
Convenience
Hypermarket
Discount/warehouse
Traditional supermarket

Municipality ln(Ωmuni)

Store ln(Ω)
Coefficient

S.E.

Coefficient

S.E.

0.05
0.19**
-0.14*
-0.22***

0.07
0.09
0.07
0.07

0.36**
-0.48
-0.30
-0.18

0.15
0.30
0.48
0.30

Notes: * p <0.1; ** p <0.05; *** p <0.01. Each reported coefficient represents the impact of agglomerations for
all store formats on a sub-sample that is limited to the indicated store format. T-statistics are clustered by
municipality and robust. The specification from Table 6 is used for the store results and Table 7 for the
municipality results.
Table 9 further examines the differential impact across property formats by asking whether the agglomeration
of specific formats has differential impacts on certain types of stores. Applying the sub-sampling approach used
in Table 8, each row represents a separate regression for the sub-sample using one type of supermarket
agglomeration at a time.5 Less than half of the coefficient estimates are statistically significant. The strongest
and most consistent results indicate that hypermarket productivity is lower when there is a higher density of
discount/warehouse within 1000 metres or within a municipality. This result is symmetrical—
discount/warehouse stores also have lower productivity when there is a density of hypermarkets. In short, these
types of format should not co-locate and are likely strong substitutes for each other.
Table 9. IV Results for format agglomerations by store format (dependent variable: ln(Sales/Mt2))
Store Format
Hypermarket Ω

Store ln(Ωformat)
Coefficient
S.E.

Municipality ln(Ωmuni & format)
Coefficient
S.E.

Traditional supermarket
0.71
0.64 0.31
0.24
Convenience
-0.90
0.78 0.13
0.25
Hypermarket
0.28
0.21 -0.16***
0.02
Discount/warehouse
-0.11***
0.04 -0.12***
0.08
Traditional Supermarket Ω
Traditional supermarket
-0.05
0.11 -0.18
0.31
Convenience
-0.01
0.08 0.45***
0.10
Hypermarket
-0.02
0.05 0.10
0.07
Discount/warehouse
0.07**
0.04 0.18
0.34
Convenience Ω
Traditional supermarket
-0.21
0.21 -0.93
1.16
Convenience
0.13
0.08 -0.10
0.16
Hypermarket
2.15*
1.28 -0.28
0.33
Discount/warehouse
0.30**
0.14 -0.16
0.13
Discount/warehouse Ω
Traditional supermarket
0.46
0.39 -1.06
1.25
Convenience
-0.25
0.62 0.24**
0.01
Hypermarket
-0.21***
0.54 -0.11***
0.04
Discount/warehouse
0.11
0.11 -0.40*
0.23
Notes: * p <0.1; ** p <0.05; *** p <0.01. Each reported coefficient represents the impact of agglomerations for a
specific store format on a sub-sample that is limited to the indicated store format. T-statistics are clustered by
municipality and robust. The specification from Table 6 is used for the store results. The specification from Table
7 is used for the municipality results.

6. Conclusion
In this paper, we analyse the effect of agglomeration on supermarket productivity. The data cover all
supermarkets in Chile from 1997 through 2010. Store characteristics such as size, operator, format, brand, sales
and location are observed. The store formats range from small convenience stores to huge box retailers called
hypermarkets (huge supermarkets are often operated by Walmart) and discount/warehouse stores that sell
packaged food and goods out of bins and stacks with almost no customer service. In between are traditional
supermarkets.
The results indicate that, on average, the density or agglomeration of other supermarkets around an individual
store has no measureable impact on productivity. One interpretation of these results is that there are very few
productivity spillovers for supermarkets. An alternative interpretation is that firms locate in locations until the
benefits of the density equal the costs of density.
The benefits for supermarkets are likely to be derived from consumption not production. This consumptiondriven agglomeration also allows for more comparison shopping in terms of price and quality. At some point,
density creates congestion thus increasing transport and opportunity costs of shopping. It also reduces prices.
The overall agglomeration results are consistent with firms entering until all positive effects are dissipated
through congestion and pricing effects. This interpretation of the results is aided by the weak regulatory
environment of Chile, which allows entry and exit with little interference.
However, when the effect of agglomerations is allowed to vary by store format, differential impacts do appear.
For example, the evidence indicates that convenience stores have higher productivity when there is an
agglomeration of all other supermarkets in a shopping district of destination. This impact is largest when the
agglomeration is from traditional supermarkets and discount/warehouses store formats. This finding is
consistent with the idea that some types of store are destinations and drive their own traffic (for example,

discount/warehouses), while other types of store benefit by being near the primary destinations. In contrast,
some types of store have no complementary interaction. For example, the discount/warehouse store format
and the hypermarket format both reduce the productivity of each other almost symmetrically. There is also
consistent evidence that stores of the same format tend to cannibalise sales from each other.
These spatial interactions of store types and types of agglomeration suggest several recommendations or
findings that should be useful for urban policy. First, if entry is left unregulated, supermarkets (as broadly
defined here) will continue to enter and create agglomerated supermarket shopping until all productivity gains
are dissipated. Second, despite the fact that big box stores tend to locate near one another (Schuetz, 2013), the
co-location of large supermarkets (hypermarkets and discount markets) should be discouraged due to high rates
of sales cannibalisation. These stores are best dispersed among the population they serve. Third, small
supermarkets should be encouraged to locate near larger and traditional supermarkets to take advantage of the
increased traffic flow.
In summary, the evidence is consistent with the idea that the market will naturally find the limits of the benefits
of supermarket density. However, within different formats there are still differential impacts of density and
hence co-location. Sometimes the productivity spillovers are positive and sometimes they are negative.
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Notes
1.Results at 500 metres to 5000 metres were tested and are available from the authors on request.
2.See: Central Bank Chile website,
at http://si3.bcentral.cl/Siete/secure/search/ViewBasket_NEW.aspx (accessed 27 June 2012).
3.See note 2.
4.For the municipality data, municipalities are identified as heavy in traditional supermarkets if all the
supermarkets are traditional, as heavy in convenience, hypermarket or discount/warehouse if the
municipality has any of these types of format.
5.It is necessary to run each format’s agglomeration measure separately because we do not have the ability to
meet the exclusion requirements for four different endogenous measures of agglomerations
simultaneously using long lagged demographic and distance data.
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